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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 14-1812
________________
DAVID CROCKETT,
Appellant
v.
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
d/b/a SEPTA; PASQUALE T. DEON, SR., in his individual capacity;
JACK K. LEARY, in his individual capacity;
FAYE MOORE, in her individual capacity;
JOSEPH M. CASEY, in his individual capacity;
LUTHER DIGGS, in his individual capacity;
PAT NOWAKOWSKI, in his individual capacity;
BERNARD COHEN, in his individual capacity;
JEFFREY KNUPPEL, in his individual capacity;
JAMES B. JORDAN, in his individual capacity;
NICHOLAS J. STAFFIERI, in his individual capacity
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-04230)
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 12, 2015
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2015)

________________
OPINION*
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
David Crockett appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his due-process claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
(“SEPTA”) and ten individual defendants. Because Crockett has failed to allege that his
harm stemmed from any affirmative act (as opposed to passive inaction), we affirm.
I.
On September 1, 2010, a trap door on Crockett’s SEPTA train “sprang forward,
striking [him] on his right leg and slam[ing] down on his left foot.” Crockett alleges that
the incident can be traced to a mechanical defect that SEPTA has known about since the
1980s yet has failed to fix. He subsequently filed a putative class action in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of himself and all other
passengers riding on his train that day. Specifically, he brought negligence claims
against SEPTA, and he brought a § 1983 due-process claim against SEPTA and the
individual defendants based on a state-created danger theory of liability.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Crockett’s § 1983 claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that Crockett failed to
allege adequately the elements of a state-created danger claim. The District Court
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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granted the motion, leaving only Crockett’s state-law tort claims. The parties
subsequently settled these claims with an agreement that Crockett could appeal the
District Court’s dismissal of his § 1983 claim. This appeal followed.
II.
Our review of a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) is plenary. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d
159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only
if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial
plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). In
undertaking that inquiry, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Heightened Independence & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
693 F.3d 345, 351 (3d Cir. 2012).
III.
Reading the facts in the light most favorable to Crockett, we agree with the
District Court that he has not pled a plausible due-process claim under a state-created
danger theory. This doctrine, which is an exception to the general rule that a state is not
required to protect citizens from harm, only applies when state actors acted affirmatively
either to expose a plaintiff to danger or to render him more vulnerable to harm. Bright v.
Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006). Crockett’s claim fails because he
has not alleged that his harm stems from any affirmative act.
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Our decision in Searles v. SEPTA, 990 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1993), is directly on
point. There we held that the plaintiff’s allegations “that [the] defendants failed to secure
the motor properly” on a SEPTA train, “and also failed to discover the alleged dangerous
condition despite numerous purported maintenance inspections,” could not proceed under
the state-created danger theory of liability because “the fundamental cause of danger was
a failure to act.” Id. at 793 (emphasis added). Likewise, while Crockett contends state
officials acted by forgoing daily inspections, passive inertia, resulting in nothing being
done, falls short of an “affirmative act in the traditional sense.” Id. That Crockett
attempts to “restat[e] the [d]efendants’ inaction as an affirmative failure to act does not
alter the passive nature of the alleged conduct.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 179
(3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013).
*

*
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Because we conclude that Crockett failed to allege that defendants took any
affirmative act to place him in danger, we need not reach the District Court’s alternative
grounds for dismissing Crockett’s § 1983 claim. We thus affirm.
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